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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Pensacola Division 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, by and through 
PAM BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, et al., 
 
 Plaintiffs, 
 
v.        Case No.: 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT 
 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official 
capacity as the Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services; 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
THE TREASURY; TIMOTHY F. 
GEITHNER, in his official capacity as the 
Secretary of the United States Department 
of the Treasury; UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; and HILDA 
L. SOLIS, in her official capacity as Secretary 
of the United States Department of Labor, 
 
 Defendants. 
___________________________________________/ 
 
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO CLARIFY 
 
 The Court should deny Defendants’ inexplicably delayed motion to “clarify” its judgment 
of January 31, 2011.  A declaratory judgment has “the force and effect of a final judgment or 
decree.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).  “Clarification” is unnecessary because the Court’s Order is clear 
and unambiguous: (1) the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “ACA” or “Act”) is 
unconstitutional and “the entire Act must be declared void”; and (2) the Court’s “declaratory 
judgment is the functional equivalent of an injunction” because “there is a long-standing 
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presumption that officials of the Executive Branch will adhere to the law as declared by the 
Court.”  Order Granting Summary Judgment at 75-76 [Doc. 150] (“Order”) (citations omitted). 
 This Court accorded respect to a coordinate branch of government by assuming that 
compliance with a duly-entered declaratory judgment order would be forthcoming and thus 
dispensing with an injunctive order.   Despite the well-established presumption that the United 
States will “adhere to the law,” Defendants now ask the Court to “clarify” its Order so as to 
allow them, irrespective of the Court’s entry of final judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor, to continue 
enforcing the ACA against “the plaintiff states, National Federation of Independent Business 
(“NFIB”) members, and individual plaintiffs pending appeal.”  Defendants’ Motion to Clarify 
[Doc. 156] (“Motion”) at 4.  If the Government was not prepared to comply with the Court’s 
judgment, the proper and respectful course would have been to seek an immediate stay, not an 
untimely and unorthodox motion to clarify.  Defendants’ Motion is, in fact, a transparent attempt, 
through the guise of seeking clarification, to obtain a stay pending appeal.  
However, Defendants conspicuously have refrained from moving forthrightly for a stay 
because they cannot meet the requisite standards for such relief.  Indeed, as shown below, they 
cannot satisfy any of the four factors governing stay requests.  Accordingly, because “time is of 
the essence in this matter[] and . . . everyone in this country would obviously benefit from 
certainty and final resolution of the case sooner rather than later,” Order of February 18, 2011, at 
1 [Doc. 157] (“2/18 Order”), the Court should stand by its prior Order, deny the Motion, and 
deny Defendants’ thinly-veiled request for a stay.1 
                                                
1 Defendants do not represent that they will persist in their non-compliance with the Court’s 
Order after the Court “clarifies” that its Order applies pending appeal, see Motion at 2, 4, 15.  
Moreover, Plaintiffs do not seek amendment of the Court’s Order and do not, therefore, renew 
their request for a formal injunction at this time.  However, if Defendants’ forthcoming reply 
suggests that, absent an injunction, they will not comply with this Court’s Order, then the Court 
should specify that Defendants are enjoined from enforcing the ACA against the Plaintiff States, 
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Moreover, in denying this motion, the Court also should make clear that it does not mean 
to entertain a subsequent stay motion with the attendant further delay.  If the Government does 
not intend to comply with this Court's Order, it should seek a stay from the Eleventh Circuit 
without further delay or further unexcused noncompliance.  If the Court is inclined to stay its 
judgment only so long as to permit Defendants to seek a stay from the Court of Appeals, 
Plaintiffs respectfully request that such a stay not exceed five (5) days. 
Argument 
I. THE COURT’S JUDGMENT IS FINAL AND BINDING 
 Defendants’ assertion that “we do not understand the Court’s declaratory judgment of its 
own force to relieve the parties to this case of any obligation or deny them any rights under the 
Act while appellate review is pending,” Motion at 6, is nothing more than wishful thinking.  It 
proceeds from the flawed assumption that the Court’s declaratory judgment is different in kind 
from any other final judgment fixing the rights of the parties, or somehow different from an 
order granting the same relief in a case in which the Government did not intend to appeal. 
It is black-letter law that “[a] declaratory judgment is binding on the parties before the 
court and is claim preclusive in subsequent proceedings as to the matters declared.”  Charles A. 
Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2771 (2010).  A declaratory judgment declares 
“the rights and other legal relations” among the parties before the Court and has “the force and 
effect of a final judgment.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201; see also Household Bank, F.S.B. v. JFS Group, 
320 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2003); Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 594 F.3d 823, 
828 (11th Cir. 2010).  Were the rule otherwise, a declaratory judgment would serve “no useful 
                                                                                                                                                          
NFIB and its members, and the Individual Plaintiffs, because the only reason the Court initially 
declined to enter an injunction was its “presumption” that Defendants would “adhere to the law.”  
Order at 75. 
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purpose as a final determination of rights.”  Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 
237, 247 (1952). 
 Defendants’ contention that the Court needs to clarify this basic legal principle “throws 
sand in [the Court’s] eyes,” see United States v. Cinergy Corp., 623 F.3d 455, 459 (7th Cir. 
2010), after the Court sought to accord respect to a coordinate branch by assuming injunctive 
relief was unnecessary.  As the Seventh Circuit aptly has remarked, “a declaratory judgment is a 
real judgment, not just a bit of friendly advice.”  Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 
782 (7th Cir. 2010).  Beyond being procedurally improper, Defendants’ Motion also is rife with 
substantive errors and misstatements of the law.  Defendants’ principal example of a declaratory 
judgment case where the government has been “free to continue to apply” a statute pending 
appellate review is Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 153-155 (1963).  Mendoza-
Martinez is wholly inapposite, however, because the Court’s decision was predicated on 28 
U.S.C. § 2282, a statute that precluded single-judge district courts from barring the operation of a 
federal regulatory scheme on constitutional grounds, and that statute was repealed by Congress 
more than a generation ago, in 1976.  See Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (Aug. 12, 1976).  
Under current law, single-judge district courts are presumed to have the authority to bar the 
operation of any act of Congress on constitutional grounds.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).2 
 Carreno v. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. 624, 628 (S.D. Fla. 1995), also relied on by 
Defendants, is similarly inapposite.  There, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
declined to be bound by the declaratory judgment of the District Court for the District of 
Columbia as to the unconstitutionality of the extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3184, entered in an 
                                                
2 In this respect, Defendants’ quotation of Mendoza-Martinez that “‘a single federal judge’ could 
‘paralyze totally the operation of an entire regulatory scheme, either state or federal, by issuance 
of a broad injunctive order’ prior to appellate review,” Motion at 5, is merely a statement of a 
policy concern underlying the discarded 28 U.S.C. § 2282.  
Case 3:10-cv-00091-RV  -EMT   Document 158    Filed 02/23/11   Page 4 of 15
 5
entirely separate case.  Carreno stands for nothing more than the proposition that non-mutual 
offensive collateral estoppel is not available against the federal government.  The Carreno court 
never suggested that the declaratory nature of the D.C. District Court’s judgment relieved the 
government from its obligation to obey the law as declared by the S.D. Florida District Court and 
to respect that court’s judgment.  Nor does Carreno suggest that the declaratory nature of this 
Court’s judgment relieves Defendants of their obligation to comply with this Court’s ruling with 
respect to the Parties before it and to treat this Court’s declaratory judgment as the “functional 
equivalent” of an injunction which must be obeyed.  See Order at 75.  Defendants’ failure to 
acknowledge these critical distinguishing aspects of Mendoza-Martinez and Carreno, and their 
marked failure to adduce any relevant authority, bespeak the Government’s desperation to avoid 
the consequences of the Court’s decision. 
 Of course, the broader problem with Defendants' theory is that a decision by them to file 
an appeal would not change the fundamental nature of this Court's Order.  If Defendants were 
not going to appeal, presumably even they would concede that they would not be free to ignore 
this Court's Order.  A party’s unilateral decision to appeal – as opposed to a stay from a court – 
simply does not alter that reality.  Indeed, under Defendants’ view that they need not comply 
with declaratory judgments pending appeal, courts would always have to issue injunctions during 
the pendency of appeals notwithstanding the well-established presumption that a declaratory 
judgment is sufficient relief in a suit against the federal government. 
 Significantly, Defendants already have raised, and this Court already has rejected, the 
argument that they should not be bound by the Court’s judgment until the appeals process has 
concluded.  Defendants previously argued that a declaratory judgment would not apply until 
“after appellate review is exhausted.”  Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
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at 43 [Doc. 137].  In response to this and other arguments, the Court held that “declaratory 
judgment is the functional equivalent of an injunction” because “there is a long-standing 
presumption that officials of the Executive Branch will adhere to the law as declared by the 
Court.”  Order at 75.  The Court would not have made such a ruling had it agreed with 
Defendants’ position that a declaratory judgment would not have immediate binding force and 
effect.  Nor, presumably, would the Court have refrained from entering a formal injunction had it 
doubted Defendants’ willingness to respect that judgment. 
 Likewise unavailing is Defendants’ suggestion that the Court could not have intended its 
judgment to have immediate effect because it allegedly failed to consider certain legal and 
equitable issues implicated by the scope of that judgment.  Motion at 11-14.  The Court 
obviously did not think that its own judgment overlooked any necessary issues since, as even 
Defendants must concede, that judgment will be binding and operative once it is affirmed on 
appeal, without any further action by the Court.  Motion at 4-5.  Regardless, identification of 
supposed errors in the scope of the Court’s judgment sheds no light whatsoever on the timing of 
the judgment’s effectiveness.  Similarly, as discussed below, those alleged errors do not warrant 
staying the Court’s judgment. 
II. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A STAY UNDER THE GUISE OF 
“CLARIFICATION” 
 
 The only fair characterization of Defendants’ Motion, seeking “clarification” that the 
Court’s final and binding declaratory judgment has no effect pending appellate review, is that it 
is a “de facto” request that the Court stay its judgment pending appeal.  This is evident from 
Defendants’ references to the stay-related factors of the judgment’s allegedly erroneous scope, 
Motion at 11-14, and from their references to “significant disruption[s]” and “wide-ranging and 
indeterminate consequences” of the judgment, Motion at 4, 7-11. 
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Defendants appear to be seeking two bites at the stay apple, by their delayed clarification 
motion and a separate stay motion to follow, see Motion at 15.  The entire stay issue should be 
resolved here and now, because “time is of the essence in this matter,” 2/18 Order at 1, and 
because it is obvious that Defendants cannot meet their heavy burden to justify such 
extraordinary relief. 
 In Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009), the Supreme Court recently reiterated the 
standards governing a stay pending appeal.  As a threshold matter, the Court emphasized that: 
“A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise 
result.”  . . . It is instead “an exercise of judicial discretion,” and “[t]he 
propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular 
case.” . . .  The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that 
the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion. 
 
Id. at 1760-61 (2009) (citations omitted).  The Court then observed that, in determining whether 
the movant has met its burden, the “legal principles have been distilled into consideration of four 
factors”: 
“(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely 
to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably 
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially 
injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the 
public interest lies.” 
 
Id. at 1761 (citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).  See also Philidor v. U. S. 
Att’y Gen., 384 Fed. Appx. 876, 878 (11th Cir. 2010).3 
 Of these four factors, the first two “are the most critical.”  Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1761.  
Indeed, in his concurring opinion in Nken (joined in by Justice Scalia), Justice Kennedy stressed 
that both factors must be satisfied, stating: 
                                                
3  While Nken dealt with the propriety of a circuit court’s stay, which is governed by Fed. R. 
App. P. 8(a), the same four-factor test fully applies to motions for stays directed to district courts 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c).  See Hilton, 481 U.S. 770 at 776 (“Under both rules, . . . the factors 
regulating the issuance of a stay are generally the same. . . . “).   
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The Court has held that “[a] stay is not a matter of right, even if 
irreparable injury might otherwise result.” . . .  When considering success 
on the merits and irreparable harm, courts cannot dispense with the 
required showing of one simply because there is a strong likelihood of the 
other.  This is evident in the decisions of Justices of the Court applying the 
traditional factors. . . .  As those decisions make clear, “‘the applicant must 
meet a heavy burden of showing not only that the judgment of the lower 
court was erroneous on the merits, but also that the applicant will suffer 
irreparable injury if the judgment is not stayed pending his appeal.’” 
 
Id. at 1763-64 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  Only if the movant has satisfied 
these first two factors do the additional questions of “harm to the opposing party and weighing 
the public interest” come into play.  Id. at 1762.   
 Defendants here have failed to satisfy any of the pertinent factors for a stay, and this is 
particularly true with regard to likelihood of success and irreparable injury.  First, Defendants 
have not made a strong showing that they are likely to prevail on appeal.  The Court’s decision 
that the ACA unconstitutionally exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers is firmly grounded in 
the Supreme Court’s established precedent: 
It would be a radical departure from existing case law to hold that 
Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.  If it has the 
power to compel an otherwise passive individual into a commercial 
transaction with a third party merely by asserting – as was done in the Act 
– that compelling the actual transaction is itself “commercial and 
economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce,” it is 
not hyperbolizing to suggest that Congress could do almost anything it 
wanted. 
Order at 42.  Similarly, the Individual Mandate, as Defendants have themselves many times 
conceded, is the centerpiece of the ACA and Congress clearly would not have enacted the 
statute’s other provisions without the mandate.  Id. at 68, 74.  Therefore, the Court properly held 
the mandate to be non-severable and struck down the entire statute.  In their motion, Defendants 
never demonstrate any basis to support a claim that they are likely to prevail on the merits of 
Case 3:10-cv-00091-RV  -EMT   Document 158    Filed 02/23/11   Page 8 of 15
 9
these issues on appeal – much less the legally required “strong showing” of likely success.  This 
failure alone is fatal to their request for issuance of a stay.   
 Second, any claim of irreparable injury is similarly without merit.  Indeed, the very fact 
that Defendants refrained from immediately filing an appeal and seeking a stay, and instead 
waited two and one-half weeks and then merely moved to clarify the final judgment, seriously 
undermines any claim of irreparable injury.  See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 463 U.S. 1315, 
1317-1318 (1983) (per Blackmun, J., in chambers) (denying stay) (EPA Administrator’s failure 
to act with dispatch “blunt[s] his claim of urgency and counsels against the grant of a stay”); 
Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 1310, 1313 (1977) (per Marshall, J., in chambers) 
(denying stay) (“Applicants have not met their burden of showing a balance of hardships in their 
favor.  Were the injury to the City from implementation of the Plan as severe as applicants now 
claim, one would think that they would have filed their petition for certiorari with dispatch. . . .  
The applicants’ delay in filing their petition and seeking a stay vitiates much of the force of their 
allegations of irreparable harm.”).  Thus, even had Defendants expressly couched this motion as 
seeking a stay, their dilatoriness would militate against its entry.  This is especially true in light 
of the discretionary and equitable nature of a stay as underscored in Nken. 
Moreover, Defendants fail to show that they are “irreparably injured” by being prevented 
from continuing to roll out the hundreds of provisions that Congress intentionally bound together 
in the unconstitutional ACA.  The preexisting status quo should be in effect – just as it will be 
once the appellate process is concluded and the Court’s judgment striking down the ACA has 
been affirmed.   That the federal government must act to reinstate that previous status quo, rather 
than impose unconstitutional requirements on the Plaintiffs that ultimately would have to be 
undone anyway, does not amount to irreparable injury.  If anything, any problems arising from 
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the ACA’s implementation – or from its cessation – must be laid at Congress’s doorstep.  In the 
interim, Congress retains the authority to act, as needed, to provide any constitutionally-proper 
and separately-enacted relief that Defendants, as enforcing agencies, might request.  Defendants’ 
failure to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement, like their failure to show strong likelihood of 
success, is fatal to their stay request. 
 Third, Defendants cannot get around the obvious costs and burdens imposed on Plaintiffs 
by the continuing implementation of the unconstitutional ACA’s provisions.  Plaintiffs have 
demonstrated in their summary judgment filings – by reference to federal agency publications 
and sworn declarations from State personnel, the NFIB, and the Individual Plaintiffs – that the 
ACA is causing them substantial harm now.  For example, the States must hire and assign 
personnel and devote substantial funds and resources now to prepare for compliance with the 
ACA; the Act’s “maintenance of efforts” requirements already are restricting States’ ability to 
control their costs; and the ACA now coerces States to offer expensive new benefits to officers 
and employees who previously were not covered.  See  ACA §§ 1001, 1201, 2001(b), 2101(b); 
see also Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts [Doc. 80-2], ¶¶ 9-11, 17, 24-26, and referenced 
attachments in Plaintiffs’ Appendix. 
 Fourth, the public interest must, first and foremost, be advanced by the protection and 
enforcement of the Constitution of the United States.  Accordingly, the public interest is best 
served by the prevention of acts of Congress deemed unconstitutional from imposing added 
burdens and costs on the States or the American people.  In the absence of a showing that 
Defendants are strongly likely to prevail on appeal, the public interest factor must be resolved in 
Plaintiffs’ favor, militating against issuance of a stay. 
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III. DEFENDANTS CANNOT ALTER THE SCOPE OF THE COURT’S FINAL 
JUDGMENT THROUGH A “MOTION TO CLARIFY” 
 
 Likewise, Defendants’ purported motion for “clarification” is infused with a scattershot 
discussion of alleged defects in the scope of the Court’s judgment, suggesting their real aim is a 
reconsideration of the Court’s ruling.  Unsurprisingly, however, Defendants have not openly 
sought relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (Motion to Alter or Amend a 
Judgment) since they plainly are not entitled to any such relief. 
“The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion are newly-discovered evidence or 
manifest errors of law or fact.  A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise 
argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”  Arthur 
v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th 
Cir. 1999), and Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)) 
(alterations omitted).  Yet, Defendants’ challenge to the scope of the Court’s judgment does 
precisely what is forbidden under Rule 59; they attempt to relitigate numerous issues in this case, 
raising arguments that they never presented and thus have waived. 
 For example, Defendants belatedly and incorrectly suggest that “the existence of an 
associational plaintiff” means that the declaratory judgment is too vague.  Motion at 12.  On the 
contrary, the law is settled that where an “association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some 
other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will 
inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured.”  Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 515 (1975); see also Wein v. Am. Huts, Inc., 313 F.Supp.2d 1356, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 
2004).  This is the very reason that associational standing exists: so that an association may 
“redress its members’ injuries.”  United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. 
Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 552 (1996).  And while the government may not “know who 
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were NFIB members at the time of the First Amended Complaint,” Motion at 12, that typically is 
the case in associational standing actions, because those members have anonymity rights.  See, 
e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).  NFIB members are perfectly capable of 
asserting their rights under the Court’s judgment, and will have the opportunity to do so if the 
government attempts to enforce the Act against them.4 
 Similarly, Defendants belatedly suggest that the Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory 
Judgment Act should have barred the Court’s decision to find the Act unconstitutional in whole.  
Motion at 7 n.5.  This newfound assertion is without merit and has been waived.  Nor can 
Defendants escape their waiver by suggesting that the statutory limitations in the Anti-Injunction 
Act and Declaratory Judgment Act are “jurisdictional.”  As for the latter, it has long been 
established that “[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act . . . is remedial, not jurisdictional.”  Wan Shih 
                                                
4 Likewise, Defendants continue to dispute Plaintiff States’ standing. Defendants’ citation to 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984), is inapposite.  As the Court correctly has ruled, it 
need not consider the standing of each Plaintiff so long as at least one has standing.  Order at 18.   
Defendants’ reference to standing questions is puzzling, because Defendants never have 
contested Plaintiff States’ showing that the Individual Mandate causes them direct injury by 
driving millions more persons onto Medicaid rolls; as the Court has determined, the Medicaid 
provisions of the ACA are unseverable from the Individual Mandate.  Thus, every Plaintiff State 
has direct standing to challenge the mandate, and has direct entitlement to protection from the 
ACA’s provisions pendente lite.  See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1987) 
(plaintiffs’ standing to challenged one provision of statute on basis of a different, 
unconstitutional and allegedly non-severable provision not questioned). Cf. 13B Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532.1 & n.53 (3d ed. 2008) (“inseverability 
can make ripe issues that otherwise would be better deferred” and “provisions that are not 
severable often can be attacked if a ripe claim is advanced as to any of them”)  (citing Blanchette 
v. Ct. Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 137 n.20 (1974)).  Moreover, Plaintiff States provided 
numerous other bases for their standing.  In addition, the Court’s ruling highlights that Congress 
asserted what amounts to a general police power in enacting the Individual Mandate and tying it 
to the remaining provisions of the Act; plainly, all States have standing to bring suit over and 
receive judicial protection from so blatant an intrusion on their sovereignty, for only they may 
constitutionally assert a general police power.  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181-82 
(1992), establishes that one of the States’ most important functions is to protect their citizens’ 
liberty against excessive assertions of power by the federal government that would usurp the 
Constitution’s division of authority between it and the States.  To hold that injunctive relief here 
applies only to a few of the Plaintiff States would be inconsistent with that overarching 
fundamental principle. 
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Hsieh v. Kiley, 569 F.2d 1179, 1181-82 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 828 (1978); see 
also Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 868 F.2d 433 (11th Cir. 1989).  While courts in 
the past have described the Anti-Injunction Act’s limitations as “jurisdictional” even though the 
statute itself does not speak in those terms (see, e.g., Hosp. Res. Pers., Inc. v. United States, 68 
F.3d 421, 424 n.3, 428 (11th Cir. 1995)), the Supreme Court recently emphasized that courts 
“have been less than meticulous” and that “when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation 
… as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”  
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511, 516 (2006).  Indeed, the Anti-Injunction Act’s 
limitations cannot truly be jurisdictional in nature because the courts “ha[ve] no authority to 
create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements,” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 
(2007).  Consistent with the foregoing, in a parallel challenge to the ACA, the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the Government had “waived” its 
“arguments concerning the Anti-Injunction Act,” which was permissible since they did not 
implicate “any defect in th[e] [c]ourt's jurisdiction.”  Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950, Mem. Op. at 2 
n.1 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011). 
Conclusion 
As a matter of law, a declaratory judgment has “the force and effect of a final judgment or 
decree.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).  Given the clarity of the Court’s Order and the straightforward law 
governing the effect of declaratory judgments, Defendants’ Motion is simply an unfounded 
attempt to justify a stay in this Court and, later, to build an improper post-judgment “record” for 
their inevitable claim in the Court of Appeals that their delay in seeking appeal and a stay is 
excused by their purported confusion about this Court’s decision. 
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For all of the foregoing reasons, and especially because “time is of the essence in this 
matter,” the Court should deny Defendants’ Motion for Clarification as well as their thinly-
disguised request for a stay.  If the Court is inclined to stay its judgment only so long as to permit 
Defendants to seek a stay from the Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs respectfully request that such a 
stay not exceed five (5) days. 
Respectfully submitted, 
   PAMELA JO BONDI 
   ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA 
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Small Business Legal Center   Washington, DC 20036 
1201 F Street, N.W., Suite 200   Telephone: (202) 861-1731 
Washington, DC 20004    Facsimile: (202) 861-1783 
Telephone: (202) 314-2061   Attorneys for Plaintiff States, National 
Facsimile: (202) 554-5572   Federation of Independent Business, Mary 
Of counsel for Plaintiff National   Brown, and Kaj Ahlburg 
Federation of Independent Business 
      Katherine J. Spohn 
      Special Counsel to the Attorney General 
      Office of the Attorney General of Nebraska 
      2115 State Capitol Building 
      Lincoln, Nebraska 68508 
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      Telephone: (402) 471-2834 
      Facsimile: (402) 471-1929 
      Email: katie.spohn@nebraska.gov 
      Attorneys for Plaintiff the State of Nebraska 
 
      Bill Cobb 
      Deputy Attorney General 
      for Civil Litigation 
      Office of the Attorney General of Texas 
      P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station 
      Austin, Texas 78711-2548 
      Telephone: (512) 475-0131 
      Facsimile: (512) 936-0545 
      Email: bill.cobb@oag.state.tx.us 
      Attorneys for Plaintiff the State of Texas 
 
      Clayton P. Kawski 
      Assistant Attorney General 
      Wisconsin Department of Justice 
      17 W. Main St. 
      Madison, WI 53707 
      Telephone: (608) 266-7477 
      Facsimile: (608) 267-2223 
      Email: kawskicp@doj.state.wi.us 
      Attorneys for Plaintiff the State of Wisconsin 
  
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that, on this 23rd day of February, 2011, a copy of the foregoing was 
served on counsel of record for all Defendants through the Court’s Notice of Electronic Filing 
system. 
 
      /s/ Blaine H. Winship 
      Blaine H. Winship 
      Special Counsel 
      Office of the Attorney General of Florida 
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